Candace Owens attended Russia's St. Petersburg International Economic Forum while the Tate brothers were in Moscow but not at the forum. A Trump-appointed commission chair, Rodney Mims Cook Jr., led a claimed U.S. delegation, but Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Congress he was 'not aware' of any official delegation — creating a disputed authorization that fractures bipartisan consensus on isolating Russia.
The record
Foreign Policy
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The June 4, 2026 sanctions on Cuba's president and Castro family members escalate unilateral economic warfare that damages U.S. soft power and alienates allies, while failing to achieve regime change. The accompanying military posture in the Caribbean has cost more than $4.7 billion from August 2025 to March 2026, per the National Priorities Project at the Watson Institute, with that total comprising naval, aircraft, special operations, and ancillary costs. Executive Order 14404, signed May 1, 2026, expanded secondary sanctions and designation authorities but, according to OFAC FAQ 1251 (released May 7, 2026), does not affect the validity of licenses issued under the CACR, including those for remittances and travel, though separate directives have tightened specific restrictions.
The Trump administration reportedly considered a Truth Social endorsement of Armenian PM Pashinyan ahead of June elections. That would break decades of U.S. electoral neutrality and hand Moscow a propaganda win. A concrete alternative: transparent neutrality, continued aid tied to democratic benchmarks, and a coordinated multilateral push to expose Russian disinformation — not a unilateral, partisan post.
The same administration that in 2018 cut $300 million in aid to Pakistan and tweeted accusations of 'lies and deceit' is now staking its Iran ceasefire on Pakistani mediation under Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Asim Munir. This reversal grants Islamabad outsized influence over a core national-security crisis without the accountability mechanisms that were stripped when aid was slashed, sidelining professional U.S. diplomats and multilateral partners.
The Trump Gaza peace plan, endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2803 (2025), has entered a first phase with Israel retaining control of 53% of Gaza, reconstruction unfunded, and the Board of Peace facing implementation challenges. The plan's text renounces annexation but critics warn its framework could normalize indefinite occupation without a credible Palestinian political track. A UN report (S/2026/418) details implementation obstacles but does not characterize the principal obstacle as lack of Palestinian representation.
Jamshid Ghomi, dual US-Iranian CEO, charged with violating US sanctions by smuggling US-origin networking and encryption equipment to Iran's military and nuclear programs; denied bond.
Hungary's new government reached a minority-rights deal with Ukraine, clearing the way for Kyiv to start formal EU membership talks after a two-year blockade.
Project 2025's trade chapter (pp 823-825) proposes executive orders for supply-chain decoupling, sanctions on US firms (e.g., Apple) via OFAC/IEEPA, visa restrictions under INA 212(f), and closure of Confucius Institutes via DOD/DOE funding bans, all leveraging national security rhetoric. The 2026 USMCA review (scheduled to begin July 1, 2026) is a near-term legislative vehicle that could embed enforceable labor and environmental standards—but the chapter fails to pursue this, instead relying on unilateralism that risks alienating allies. No administration executive orders have yet been issued on these proposals, but the USMCA review preparation phase is active, making this a concrete policy window. Civil society groups and labor unions have said the deal should not be extended as-is for another 16-year term, with a March 2024 letter from 80+ organizations to USTR specifically calling for renegotiation.
Project 2025 proposes expanding CFIUS to block Chinese FDI in US high-tech, cracking down on Chinese content in USMCA-origin goods, and treating 300,000 Chinese STEM students and researchers as an information-harvesting threat—actions that conflate legitimate security concerns with race-to-the-bottom trade fears, risking damage to US research competitiveness and supply chains.
Project 2025's Reciprocal Trade Act proposal and the April 2025 reciprocal tariff executive order treat tariff non-reciprocity as the sole trade problem, ignoring that the USMCA's enforceable labor and environmental chapters remain underused while the U.S. food trade deficit with Canada and Mexico grew 28.9% from 2019 to 2025 (source: USDA ERS data, as of April 2025). The chapter's national-security framing of the trade deficit—citing Stalin—justifies unilateral tariff escalation that raises consumer prices, hits allied supply chains, and offers no mechanism to raise wages or enforce standards.
This week's relative quiet along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border masks escalating violence and a deepening humanitarian crisis, with UNAMA data showing a sharp spike in civilian casualties from Pakistani military operations and over one million Afghan refugees forcibly deported since October 2023. A diplomatic, multilateral approach is urgently needed.
Project 2025's endnotes on USAGM call for consolidating oversight and ending editorial protections. The key action — rescinding the statutory 'firewall' that guaranteed editorial independence at Voice of America and other networks — was already executed in December 2020 by Trump-appointed CEO Michael Pack. That regulatory repeal remains in effect, leaving USAGM networks vulnerable to direct political control and undermining their credibility as a source of objective news in authoritarian-controlled information spaces.
By March–July 2025, 85% of the U.S. Agency for Global Media staff had been laid off or resigned, gutting the very shortwave radio capacity that Project 2025 itself calls 'of critical strategic importance' in conflict zones like Ukraine. The administration has already implemented deep cuts, while the goal of eliminating VOA's editorial firewall and placing broadcasters under direct State Department or NSC control, detailed in Project 2025's Chapter on Media Agencies, remains not yet fully enacted. The result is a self-inflicted wound to American soft power, ceding information terrain to authoritarian competitors.
Project 2025's Agency for International Development chapter proposes dissolving USAID and folding its functions into the State Department, centralizing foreign aid under political control, and prioritizing bilateral assistance over multilateral programs—reforms that would diminish independent humanitarian and development expertise.
Project 2025 proposes eliminating the Immigration Detention Ombudsman (OIDO) and Citizenship Ombudsman (CISOMB), stripping the Civil Rights Office (CRCL) of independence, and moving the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) to DHS—centralizing immigration enforcement and removing independent oversight. As of this writing, these specific statutory eliminations and the ORR transfer have not been fully executed, but the administration has taken steps to undermine IG independence and restrict DHS civil rights communications.
The United States is pivoting from democracy promotion to engaging Myanmar's junta for rare earth minerals, risking legitimizing a regime responsible for documented war crimes.
Project 2025 proposes consolidating U.S. international broadcasting into a centralized pro-freedom messaging machine and directing the State Department to help the Pentagon go 'on offence' in cyberspace, both of which risk politicizing public diplomacy and escalating conflict without accountability mechanisms.
The claim that Russia has filed an ICJ case against Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia over alleged discrimination of Russian-speaking residents is not confirmed by current reporting or ICJ docket records. The provided search queries for 'ICJ docket search Russia Baltic states discrimination' and 'Moscow ICJ case Latvia Lithuania Estonia filed' returned no results, indicating no such filing has been publicly recorded. Russia's pattern of using multilateral forums to weaponize minority rights rhetoric is well-documented, but this specific legal action remains unsubstantiated as of this writing.
Russia has announced plans to file an ICJ complaint against Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia over alleged discrimination against Russian speakers, but no formal filing has been confirmed. The bundle shows Russia's sustained diplomatic campaign using international fora to delegitimize Baltic sovereignty, with statelessness affecting about 4.5% of Estonia's population and half a million stateless persons in the EU, mostly in Latvia and Estonia.
The Intelligence Community chapter of Project 2025 (pages 217-219) proposes restoring congressional oversight via the Intelligence Authorization Act and reforming the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act. While these proposals appear to strengthen accountability, the chapter's broader foreign policy recommendations risk placing intelligence in a supporting role for aggressive intervention—potentially hollowing out oversight reforms and politicizing analysis.
Project 2025's State Department chapter repeats debunked claims about the JCPOA while omitting the role of foreign lobbying — particularly by the MEK — in shaping its Iran posture. Its Venezuela section embraces maximalist pressure without addressing the strategic costs of regime-change advocacy or the oversight gaps that allow foreign influence to distort U.S. policy.
The bundle shows no specific candidate or program at risk in Colombia's 2026 election. The actual threat is eroded State Department and USAID institutional capacity, which undermines U.S. ability to sustain multilateral alliances regardless of who wins. This piece corrects prior unsupported claims.
Recent AtlasIntel/SEMANA polls show a 16.0% undecided/other bloc in Colombia's presidential race, reflecting deep public frustration with a binary choice that ignores structural violence. Meanwhile, U.S. military operations in Venezuela, the Caribbean, and the Eastern Pacific have cost at least $4.7 billion from August 2025 to March 2026, according to a Brown University Costs of War Project brief—without congressional authorization—yet these regional expenditures are omitted from election coverage and are not tied to improving Colombian security.
On May 31, 2026, Colombians vote in a presidential first round where leftist Iván Cepeda leads polling, but no runoff matchup is confirmed. Meanwhile, the U.S. has spent at least $4.7 billion on unilateral military operations in Venezuela, the Caribbean, and the Eastern Pacific (August 2025–March 2026) without congressional authorization, destabilizing the Andean security environment and undermining the diplomatic investment needed to support Colombia's democratic process.
A highway bombing by Iván Mordisco's FARC dissident faction killed 20 people in Cauca, undermining President Petro's 'Total Peace' policy ahead of the first-round presidential election on May 25, 2026. Polls show leftist Iván Cepeda likely facing conservative Paloma Valencia in a runoff, with late surges by Abelardo de la Espriella complicating the race. The violence exposes deeper structural roots—state absence, illicit economies, land inequality—that U.S. diplomatic and aid investment could historically address, but current operational costs of $4.7 billion in Venezuela-related military operations risk diverting resources from civilian tools.
The Trump administration's sanctions relief for Belarus, announced by envoy John Coale on March 19, 2026, and formalized via OFAC General License 14 on March 26, 2026, rewards a one-time prisoner release — 250 political prisoners freed on March 19 — while spring96.org's February 2026 report estimates 1,120 political prisoners remain, and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya in March 2026 cited 'more than 1,200' (per her X post). This deal lacks verifiable democratic benchmarks, undermining the credibility of U.S. sanctions and encouraging authoritarian behavior globally.
President Trump is working to thaw relations with Belarus's Alexander Lukashenko, Europe's last dictator, through prisoner swaps and sanctions relief, risking the erosion of democratic norms and emboldening authoritarian regimes.
President Trump's invitation to Belarusian President Lukashenko to join the 'Board of Peace' and the concurrent sanctions relief for a prisoner release of 250 individuals rewards a dictator for minimal concessions. As of 21 May 2026, 841 political prisoners remain behind bars (a count that varies; by 28 May 2026, Viasna reported 854), and the Board of Peace process is a separate diplomatic engagement from the sanctions-relief deal; no documented linkage exists between the Board and future prisoner releases or political reforms. The approach alienates key allies and undermines leverage for systemic change.
The Trump administration is actively thawing relations with Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko—including a possible White House visit—trading normalization for prisoner releases and a potential wedge between Minsk and Moscow, while sidelining democratic opposition and European allies.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has ordered the withdrawal of about 5,000 U.S. troops from Germany over the next six to twelve months, a move announced amid tensions between the Trump administration and German leadership over U.S.-Israel military operations against Iran.
Project 2025's USCIS proposals — now substantially in execution — seek to repeal Temporary Protected Status, end humanitarian parole programs, restructure immigration agencies around enforcement, and impose new fee barriers on asylum seekers. Each of these moves carries measurable diplomatic and humanitarian costs that extend well beyond the water's edge.
French President Emmanuel Macron has used a high-profile visit to Athens and a series of public rebukes to chart a course of European strategic autonomy, as the Trump administration publicly mocks its closest allies and demands military support for an Iran war that those same allies have chosen not to enable. The episode exposes the structural cost of treating alliances as purely transactional: France, Spain, and Italy are all now restricting U.S. military access in different, documented ways — and Washington is responding with personal insults rather than diplomacy.
Project 2025's DHS chapter reframes migration almost entirely as a military-enforcement problem, stripping out the diplomatic, development, and humanitarian tools that address root causes — the absence of which guarantees the cycle of border pressure continues indefinitely.
Project 2025's defense chapter calls for nuclear arsenal expansion, a Taiwan-first force planning construct, and sweeping acquisition reforms that accelerate spending while bypassing the congressional oversight mechanisms that already fail to catch a department that has never passed a clean audit. Loosening budget controls without strengthening audit requirements is not modernization — it is institutionalizing unaccountability at scale.