GPS Spoofing Surge: War and Crime Expose U.S. Navigation Vulnerabilities

The war in Iran has weaponized electronic warfare against civilian navigation. Since mid-2025, Skuld reports numerous vessels in the Persian Gulf experiencing AIS spoofing and jamming, a growing maritime security concern (source: skuld.com/topics/ship/navigation/ais-spoofing-and-jamming-in-the-persian-gulf-a-growing-maritime-security-concern/). Meanwhile, OpsGroup documented a 500% increase in GPS spoofing affecting civil aviation in 2024, with an average of 1,500 flights per day being spoofed, up from 300 per day in the first half of 2024 (source: ops.group/blog/gps-spoofing-final-report/). These are not abstract threats—they are live, escalating incidents in theaters of conflict where U.S. allies and commercial operators are the targets.

Yet the U.S. has not mandated GPS-independent backup systems—like eLoran or inertial navigation—for commercial aircraft or vessels. As of this writing, the administration has not publicly committed to such a mandate, and the broader deregulatory push in agencies like the FAA and Maritime Administration resists 'burdensome' requirements. The FAA's rulemaking authority under 49 U.S.C. § 44701 to prescribe minimum standards for safety equipment has not been exercised for navigation backups, and no Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is pending. The real burden, however, is subsidizing a vulnerability that adversaries actively exploit. A single catastrophic spoofing incident—a plane forced off course, a tanker grounded in a conflict zone—could cost billions and cause mass casualties. Congress should direct the FAA and Maritime Administration to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking within 90 days requiring GPS-independent backup for all commercial aircraft and vessels operating in U.S. airspace or calling at U.S. ports. The cost is minuscule compared to the price of a single failure.