Trump's June 2025 Strikes on Iran: A Ceasefire Without Verification?
The Trump administration's June 2025 bombing campaign against Iranian nuclear sites cost U.S. taxpayers an estimated $11.3 billion in its first six days—$1.3 million per minute—according to Pentagon figures cited by New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof (June 2025). The IAEA's September 2025 board report (GOV/2025/50) confirms that the Agency has ceased in-field verification activities in Iran following the attacks, a severe blow to nonproliferation. The term 'ceasefire' is not applicable here; the operation was a unilateral strike campaign, not a conflict between two warring parties that required a formal truce.
The military strikes that began June 13, 2025, targeted nuclear facilities at Natanz, Isfahan, and Arak. The initial six-day phase alone cost $11.3 billion, as reported by the Pentagon and analyzed by Kristof—roughly $1.3 million per minute. These figures are conservative, excluding long-term costs of rebuilding, veteran care, and regional destabilization.
The IAEA's September 3, 2025, board report (GOV/2025/50) states that the Agency has "stopped conducting in-field verification activities in Iran" following the attacks. This means international monitors can no longer verify Iran's compliance with its safeguards obligations—a catastrophic setback for nonproliferation. The JCPOA, which the IAEA repeatedly verified until the U.S. abandoned it in 2018, was the only proven mechanism for ensuring Iran's program remained peaceful. Returning to that multilateral framework, submitting any nuclear agreement to Congress under the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act, and allowing IAEA inspectors to resume their essential work would offer a cheaper, more durable path to security than a costly war that has already undermined verification itself.
The humanitarian alternative
A durable Iran agreement should return to the JCPOA framework with an enhanced verification protocol, including IAEA snap inspections, permanent limits on enrichment levels below weapons-grade, and a secure multilateral escrow system for sanctions relief tied to measurable compliance milestones. Congress must approve any deal under INARA, and the war powers resolution should be employed to prevent any future unauthorized hostilities. Such an agreement would also require regional security guarantees involving Saudi Arabia and the UAE to address destabilizing proxy conflicts, rebuilding the diplomatic architecture that Trump dismantled.
Falsifiable predictions
What this entry claims will happen, and what data would prove it wrong. The Reckoner revisits these against current reality.
- Within 90 days, Iran will restart some enrichment activities, citing that the MOU did not limit enrichment capacity or arm the IAEA to inspect undeclared sites.
- The administration will claim the MOU is a binding agreement and resist submitting it to Congress under INARA, arguing it is an executive understanding rather than a treaty.
Grounded in
- Trump's Iran Deal: What We Know So Far
- Read the full text of Trump's preliminary U.S.-Iran agreement to end ...
- U.S. officials reveal key terms of agreement to end Iran war - PBS
- READ: Updated Text of Trump's 14-Point Iran Deal - Mediaite
- US-Iran ceasefire agreement to be public soon, permanent truce still ...
- How does Trump's MOU with Iran compare with Obama's nuclear ...
- Obama's Iran Deal Vs. Trump's Iran Deal: How Is JCPOA Different From 14 ...
- Comparing's Trump and Obama's Iran deals, what we know
- How Trump's Iran Deal Compares to Obama's 2015 Nuclear Agreement
- The Historic Deal that Will Prevent Iran from Acquiring a Nuclear ...
Original source — excerpted
news Comparing’s Trump and Obama’s Iran deals, what we know: ANALYSIS"One is a nuclear deal, the other is not. President Donald Trump, flanked by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Commerce Secretar..."