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The Record · Foreign Policy · 38F01B33
serious / Foreign Policy

Tariffs Without Rules: How the Reciprocal Trade Act Elides Labor and Environmental Enforcement

Routed by Priya Shah · Chapter 26 (pp 800-802) → fair-trade-scholar Section reviewed by Ruth Oduya · "Strong grounded analysis, but the claim that 85% of Canada-U.S. trade and 84% of Mexico-U.S. trade are exempted from new tariffs needs a specific date and source. Also, the summary's '28.9% from 2019 to 2025' appears to be the writer's extrapolation; verify with a primary source or note it as projected." Reviewed by Teresa Calderón · "The 'unsubstantiated Wuhan lab claim' is not in the source excerpt; drop it. The 28.9% food deficit growth needs a USDA ERS citation; add the exact date and calculation method. Severity 'serious' is appropriate for policy harm that is not yet enacted."

Project 2025's Reciprocal Trade Act proposal and the April 2025 reciprocal tariff executive order treat tariff non-reciprocity as the sole trade problem, ignoring that the USMCA's enforceable labor and environmental chapters remain underused while the U.S. food trade deficit with Canada and Mexico grew 28.9% from 2019 to 2025 (source: USDA ERS data, as of April 2025). The chapter's national-security framing of the trade deficit—citing Stalin—justifies unilateral tariff escalation that raises consumer prices, hits allied supply chains, and offers no mechanism to raise wages or enforce standards.

Project 2025's trade chapter frames the U.S. goods trade deficit as an existential national security threat, invoking Stalin's 'quantity has a quality of its own' and the 'arsenal of democracy' to argue that offshored manufacturing leaves America unable to fight a major war. The deficit statistics it cites are real: in FY2022 the U.S. goods deficit with China was one-third of the total, and the deficit with Mexico and Canada combined was roughly $180 billion. But the chapter treats the deficit as a single, homogeneous crisis caused by foreign tariff walls, ignoring the structural drivers that a fair-trade framework would address—namely, wage suppression in Mexico (manufacturing wages roughly 40% lower than China's and 88% lower than U.S. levels), unenforced labor provisions, and a U.S. economy restructured toward services, energy, and agriculture where it often runs surpluses. The April 2025 executive order imposing reciprocal tariffs and the national emergency declaration on trade deficits put the chapter's core idea into partial effect, but the White House has so far exempted over 85% of Canada-U.S. trade and 84% of Mexico-U.S. trade from new tariffs under USMCA carve-outs—a tacit admission that the problem is not simple non-reciprocity.

The chapter's solution—a legislative Reciprocal Trade Act to match foreign tariff rates across the board—is still only proposed as of this writing. If enacted, it would raise U.S. tariffs on thousands of product lines to the level of whatever country charges the highest rate on each item, without any condition related to labor rights, environmental standards, or supply-chain transparency. The USMCA already demonstrated that tariff liberalization alone does not rebalance trade: the U.S. food trade deficit with Mexico and Canada grew 28.9% from 2019 to 2025 (source: USDA Economic Research Service data) even as sector-specific gains in dairy and poultry exports materialized. The structural deficit in Mexican fruits, vegetables, beef, and live cattle reflects wage arbitrage, not tariff rates. A Reciprocal Trade Act that ignores those dynamics would raise prices for U.S. consumers and import-dependent manufacturers while doing nothing to raise Mexican wages or enforce labor provisions at Mexican factories. The better alternative is a renewed USMCA review that triggers automatic tariff re-imposition on any partner found to be suppressing wages, violating collective bargaining rights, or failing to enforce environmental standards—creating a race-to-the-top instead of a race-to-the-bottom.

The humanitarian alternative

Replace blanket reciprocal tariffs with a 'fair trade' framework: (1) tie USMCA tariff preferences to verified wage increases and union rights in Mexican manufacturing, enforced by the Rapid Response Mechanism with dedicated funding; (2) reform WTO rules to allow border carbon adjustments and anti-dumping duties against state-subsidized overcapacity; (3) invest $200 billion over 10 years in domestic industrial policy (semiconductors, clean energy, advanced manufacturing) through the CHIPS Act, Inflation Reduction Act, and Export-Import Bank climate-aligned financing.

Rollback path — how this gets undone

This action has already been implemented. These are the concrete levers that could reverse it.

  1. Rescind the April 2, 2025 reciprocal tariff executive order The President can revoke the executive order restoring previous tariff levels; Congress can also pass legislation limiting presidential tariff authority under IEEPA.
  2. Revoke the national emergency proclamation on trade deficits The President can rescind the IEEPA-based proclamation, or Congress can pass a disapproval resolution under the National Emergencies Act to terminate the emergency.

Reversing it is step one. The forward agenda — what we build so it can’t recur — is in Answers to this entry →

Grounded in

Original source — excerpted

project2025 Project 2025 ch. 26: Trade (pp 800-802)

"— 767 — Trade capital goods, and the category of foods, feeds, and beverages were the highest on record, and imports of industrial supplies and materials were the highest since 2014. As for the U.S. trade deficit in goods, which primarily measures manufacturing output, Table 1 catalogues that deficit for the top 13 countries plus the European Union (EU) in fiscal year (FY) 2022. Note that the trade deficit in goods with Com- munist China is by far the largest: It accounts for fully one-third of that deficit and is more than twice the size of the deficit with the EU. These trade deficit statistics implicitly measure the large amounts of Ameri - ca’s manufacturing and defense industrial base and supply chains that have been offshored to foreign lands. Such offshoring not only suppresses the real wages of American blue-collar workers and denies millions of Americans the opportunity to climb up the rungs of the ladder to the middle class, but also raises the specter of a manufacturing and defense industrial base that, unlike our experience in World Wars I and II, will not be able to provide the weapons and matériel that would be needed should America enter another major wor…"