Project 2025's DOT Aviation Proposals: Deregulation, Pilot Safety, and the Hidden Distributive Cost for Small Communities
Project 2025 proposes eliminating the Essential Air Service subsidy for 200 small airports, suggesting a reduction in the 1,500-hour copilot requirement or use of simulator training, separating air traffic control from the FAA (legislative action required), and restructuring FAA funding to operate 'more like a business.' These measures would concentrate aviation resources in profitable hub markets, weaken safety for smaller communities, and privatize air traffic control revenue, shifting costs onto rural and lower-income travelers.
Project 2025's DOT chapter treats aviation as a market to be deregulated rather than a public utility with distributive consequences. The proposal to end the Essential Air Service (EAS) subsidy, framed as ending a 'temporary' program from the 1970s, would strip air service from 200 small airports, predominantly in rural and lower-income areas. The argument that this would 'free pilots for larger markets' ignores that those larger markets already have robust competition; the real effect is to strand communities that rely on EAS for medical access, economic connectivity, and emergency transport. Meanwhile, suggesting a reduction in the 1,500-hour copilot requirement—a safety rule born from the 2009 Colgan Air crash that killed 50 people—would lower the bar for entry into the cockpit, prioritizing airline profit margins over passenger safety.
The FAA restructuring proposals, including separating the air traffic organization from the FAA and moving to user-fee funding, replicate a failed deregulation script. When ATC is split off and funded by fees, it becomes vulnerable to political capture by large airlines that can prioritize their own routes. The claim that the FAA should 'operate more like a business' ignores that its core mission is public safety, not profit. The proposed exit from R&D and reliance on private-sector certification would cede standard-setting to industry, repeating the pattern seen in financial deregulation where self-certification led to catastrophic failures. DataComm being available in only 7 of 20 high-altitude centers is a symptom of underinvestment, not a justification for privatization. The solution is not to starve the FAA of appropriations but to fund it adequately with progressive revenue sources—such as a financial transaction tax—to ensure universal, safe service.
Finally, the international dimension—withholding negotiations with China and using CFIUS to restrict foreign investment—is selectively nationalist. It protects incumbent U.S. carriers while ignoring that foreign airline investments are often a lifeline for innovation. The distributive outcome of this chapter is clear: wealth transfers from rural and small-community taxpayers to large airline shareholders, while safety standards are eroded. The alternative is to maintain and even expand EAS as a universal service obligation; maintain the 1,500-hour rule as a proven safety measure; and reform FAA funding through progressive appropriations, not user fees, ensuring that the burden falls on the wealthy and corporate entities, not on rural passengers or low-income flyers.
Original source — excerpted
project2025 Project 2025 ch. 21: Department of Commerce (pp 664-666)"— 631 — Department of Transportation are providing access to capital to foreign airlines for innovations and new equipment purchases that U.S. airlines cannot match. The U.S. should use the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process to keep out nefarious foreign actors while allowing investment from investors in designated like-minded countries so long as U.S.-based investors maintain plurality ownership. l Establish a New Entry Initiative that commits the federal government to approving or rejecting the applications of new air carriers within 12 months. l Initiate a rulemaking to allocate slot-pairs more consistently to airlines at capacity-controlled airports on the primary basis of safety, maximizing capacity, and competition. In a perfect world, the market would dictate these options, but in the highly regulated international aviation sector, the current incentives are to keep out com- petitors. Slot regulations have not been updated since the 1990s. Well-meaning legislation and the pilot shortage are adversely affecting aviation safety. In the wake of the 2009 Colgan Airlines crash, all commercial pilots and copilots were required to h…"